Chinese Propaganda

Chinese Propaganda

Media Blackout

Japanese troops marching toward Nanking. Photo used by P. R. Dept. of the China Expeditionary Force of Japan.

Japanese troops marching toward Nanking. Photo used by P. R. Dept. of the China Expeditionary Force of Japan.

“Nanking’s greatest fear, which explains the sudden evacuation of the capital despite the fact that the Japanese troops are still 110 miles east of the city gates, is looting by Chinese troops – not fear of bombardment from Japanese warships,” wrote a correspondent for the Chicago Daily News, but, according to Time magazine (January 10, 1938), the dispatch was censored by the Chinese government led by Chiang Kai-shek.

It goes without saying that not only the Japanese government but also the Chinese government imposed a strict media blackout and carried on active propaganda against Japan throughout the Sino-Japanese War.

The above article, for instance, included the following sentences but they were all slashed out by the Chinese authorities.

Inside the Chinese lines the utmost confusion prevails…. Chinese troops have not been paid since August…. There is severe lack of food for front-line troops…. Demoralization had resulted from lack of attention for the Chinese wounded….

Then, too, might be added the strong resentment of the Chinese front-line troops at the fact that while they are under constant aerial bombings from Japanese bombers no Chinese bombers have appeared during daylight hours, although every Chinese soldier had been given to understand that Chiang Kai-shek’s chief threat to Japan consisted in his air force…. What now? Japan has succeeded in plunging China into chaos which will take several years, perhaps decades, to straighten out….

With China’s near collapse understood, neither Russia nor any other nation will feel desirous of giving China military assistance.

International Department of the Board of Information

The headquarters of the International Committee for the Nanking Safety Zone. December 13, 1937.

The headquarters of the International Committee for the Nanking Safety Zone. December 13, 1937.

“It was not necessary for the [Chinese] Ministry of Propaganda to tell the outside world about the Rape of Nanking,” wrote a member of the Special Defense Unit of the U.S. Department of Justice, William Daugherty, in 1942.

“It was the foreigners – Americans, British, Germans – who gave to the outside world the shocking account that they had been forced to witness.”

According to Daugherty, even the official Chinese Board of Information in Hankow (Chiang Kai-shek moved the military headquarters from Nanking to Hankow before the city was taken over by the Japanese) learned of the orgy of bloodshed from foreign sources in Shanghai. [97]

Once they found out about the atrocities, however, the Board of Information availed themselves of the golden opportunity to publicize their cause in the Second Sino-Japanese War to the world.

In the United States the Board was in close contact with numerous relief organizations and pressure groups that sympathized with China such as American Friends of the Chinese People, American Committee for Non-Participation in Japanese Aggression, Associated Boards for Christian Colleges in China, United Council for Civilian Relief in China, and China Information Service led by Frank Price of the Theological Seminary at the University of Nanking, which was established in September 1938 in Washington D.C. [98]

Their propaganda efforts soon caused the stories of brutal Japanese conduct brought by those missionaries and others in Nanking to be widely circulated nationwide through newspapers, magazines and books.

The Board of Information was founded in November 1937 as an agency of the Nationalist Government of China. [99] Headed by Dr. Wang Shih-chieh, an official of ministerial rank, it was made up of two subdivisions, one for domestic propaganda and the other for foreign publicity.

The film made by an American Missionary, John Magee, was shown all over the United States.

The film made by an American Missionary, John Magee, was shown all over the United States.

Hollington K. Tong, a graduate of the University of Missouri School of Journalism and a famous journalist known as “Holly” among correspondents in China, became the head of the latter subdivision called the International Department of the Board of Information. Based in the new capital of Chungking, the International Department was engaged in various propaganda activities.

James L. Shen, or “Jimmy,” commanded the organization’s English section in Chungking with six other Chinese writers, all of whom graduated from American missionary institutions in China. They published a number of bulletins, special handouts, state documents, speeches by the Generalissimo for a monthly magazine in English, China at War.

Warren Lee, a former teacher in a Chinese School in Rangoon, was in charge of the photographic section. Frederick J. Chen, or “Freddy,” headed the business section. Along with the National Military Council, the Board also briefed their “news” at the regular weekly press conference in Chungking to foreign correspondents, visitors and embassy officials. [100]

Outside of China, the International Department established bureaus in London, Montreal, Sydney, Mexico City and Singapore and employed advisors for “intelligence,” “liaison” and “public relations” in those countries. [101] The Board hired Harold John Timperley, a China correspondent for the Manchester Guardian, and sent him to Europe. Earl H. Leaf, a former China correspondent and the Far Eastern Manager of the United Press, also worked for the Board, advising various China groups in New York.

Accounts of the Nanking Atrocities: Harold John Timperley and Hsü Shuhsi

Bodies left unburied along the Yangtze River. Photo taken by a Japanese soldier, Murase Moriyasu, of the 17th Motorized Company of the Meguro Supply and Transport Regiment.

Bodies left unburied along the Yangtze River. Photo taken by a Japanese soldier, Murase Moriyasu, of the 17th Motorized Company of the Meguro Supply and Transport Regiment.

Probably the first comprehensive description of the ruthlessness and inhumanity demonstrated by the Japanese soldiers in Nanking was compiled and edited by Timperley in a book titled What War Means (in America it was titled The Japanese Terror in China).

The book featured the official statements, protests and some private letters written by the members of the International Committee for the Nanking Safety Zone. It was translated into other languages and published as early as July 1938 in London, New York, Calcutta, Paris and Hankow. [102]

Case after case of plundering, rape and mass executions in the book not only confirmed the news stories formerly reported by Tillman Durdin of the New York Times and Archibald Steele of the Chicago Daily News but also provided more vivid imagery of what actually happened after all the foreign correspondents had left Nanking.

Although Timperley was working as an advisor to the Chiang Kai-shek’s propaganda organization, it seemed he was motivated by his strong conviction against war rather than his personal sympathy with Chinese.

In fact, Timperley took the trouble to pay homage to his two anonymous Japanese friends in the forward of What War Means. One of the two Japanese, a friend who was of “rare fineness of intellect and feeling,” [103] Matsumoto Shigeharu, the Shanghai bureau chief of Domei News Agency, recalled Timperley talking about the publication of the book with scruples to those Japanese who deserve “admiration and respect.” [104]

After the publication of the book, Timperley actively wrote essays and articles whose themes were to make sense of Japan’s “indigenous chauvinism” and “the generation of an aggressive military spirit.” [105] In his works such as “Yoshida Shoin Martyred Prophet of Japanese Expansionism,” an essay for Far Eastern Quarterly, and Japan: A World Problem, he advocated drastic internal reforms in Japan and international peacekeeping arrangements for the Far East. [106]

An old woman killed by a Japanese soldier outside Nanking near Tse Hsia Shan. Photo taken by an American missionary, Earnest Forster.

An old woman killed by a Japanese soldier outside Nanking near Tse Hsia Shan. Photo taken by an American missionary, Earnest Forster.

According to his obituary in the Times (London) and the Manchester Guardian, in 1943 Timperley started seven years of service with the United Nations and its specialized organizations including UNRRA and UNESCO. [107]

A political scientist and advisor to China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Hsü Shuhsi, also had an access to the reports and letters sent from Westerners in Nanking. On behalf of the Council of International Affairs, an officially subsidized association operating in Chungking, Hsü published The War Conduct of the Japanese in 1938 which featured some documents of the Safety Zone such as the report written by Miner Searle Bates on December 15 [108] that described “grim tales of massacre, looting and rape during Nanking’s capture.” [109]

The following year, he compiled the records of the International Committee’s work in a book titled Documents of the Nanking Safety Zone. The book contained numerous accounts of the atrocities written by the foreign witnesses and provided more substantial evidence in volume than Timperley’s What War Means. It was widely distributed in the United States through Chinese governmental organizations and their sympathizers to arouse international support. [110]

As a demonstration that these organizations succeeded, the library of the University of Missouri-Columbia where Hollington K. Tong, the head of the International Department of the Board of Information, graduated from holds copies of the above two books as well as A New Digest of Japanese War Conduct written by Hsü in 1941.

Of the three books, the first two were given by the Council of International Affairs to the University and the other by China Information Service, the organization headed by Frank Price of the Theological Seminary at the University of Nanking.

Propaganda and Resistance in Nanking

A Chinese propaganda poster on the wall that shows "Cruelty of the Japanese Devils!" Photo taken by Murase.

A Chinese propaganda poster on the wall that shows “Cruelty of the Japanese Devils!” Photo taken by Murase.

The atrocities committed by the Imperial Army naturally resulted in widespread resentment and fierce defiance toward the Japanese soldiers by Chinese citizens. Inside the walled city and its vicinity, thousands of peasants voluntarily formed organizations called “Red Spear Society” and ambushed the enemy soldiers.

A certain group of resisters secretly printed leaflets that called for strong patriotism, some of which read “Show your conscience, fellow countrymen,” or “The National Army will attack Nanking in a few days and kill all the Japanese devils and [Chinese] traitors.” Those leaflets were distributed in schools, movie theaters and buses in Nanking.

The Nationalist Government and the Communist Party also covertly, and sometimes overtly, established, instructed, and armed anti-Japan organizations inside and outside of the city. Once in a while those armed groups struck the Japanese troops occupying the city. Especially some underground communist rebels and the New Fourth Army were effectively deployed and fought against the invaders throughout the city’s occupation. [111]

Even in the early days, there were unprompted subversive activities in the Safety Zone by Chinese soldiers in hiding. For example, the New York Times reported the following incident with the headline, “Ex-Chinese Officers Among U. S. Refugees; Colonel and His Aides Admit Blaming the Japanese for Crimes in Nanking,” on January 4, 1938:

SHANGHAI, Jan. 3 – American professors remaining at Ginling College in Nanking as foreign members of the Refugee Welfare Committee were seriously embarrassed to discover that they had been harboring a deserted Chinese Army colonel and six of his subordinate officers. The professors had, in fact, made the colonel second in authority at the refugee camp.

The officers, who had doffed their uniforms during the Chinese retreat from Nanking, were discovered living in one of the college buildings. They confessed their identity after Japanese Army searchers found they had hidden six rifles, five revolvers, a dismounted machine gun and ammunition in the building.

The ex-Chinese officers in the presence of Americans and other foreigners confessed looting in Nanking and also that one night they dragged girls from the refugee camp into the darkness and the next day blamed Japanese soldiers for the attacks. The ex-officers were arrested and will be punished under martial law and probably executed. [112]

Dr. Robert Wilson, medical doctor at the University of Nanking, jotted down the circumstances in his diary when Japanese soldiers found buried weapons in a refugee camp. From December 30, 1937, the diary read:

Today some poor fool who was annoyed at the man in charge of one of the refugee camps in the Sericulture building brought some Japanese soldiers around and showed them where a half a dozen rifles had been buried on the grounds. There was an unholy row and four men were taken away, one being charged with the heinous crime of being a colonel in the Chinese Army. [113]

Interview: Kasahara Tokushi [114]

Japanese troops and Chinese street vendors in Nanking.

Japanese troops and Chinese street vendors in Nanking.

Kasahara Tokushi is a professor of History at Tsuru University. He has published various books and articles on the Nanking Atrocities (see Works Cited). He has also served as a visiting professor at Nanjing Normal University where the Research Center of Nanjing Massacre by the Japanese Aggressors is located.

“Of course there were propaganda activities and some resistance in Nanjing against Japanese troops. Japan invaded their land, killed their loved ones and took away their properties. Without doubt there were some Chinese who sought an opportunity to give the Japanese troops a blow.”

“But it was not systematic enough to threaten the Imperial Army. There was rather sporadic resistance. At any rate, it does not give any excuse for illegal executions, let alone rape, looting and other atrocities perpetrated by the Japanese troops….”

“Some ‘deniers’ argue that Nanjing was much more peaceful than we generally think. They always show some photographs with Chinese refugees selling some food in the street or Chinese people smiling in the camps. They are forgetting about Japanese propaganda. The Imperial Army imposed strict censorship. Any photographs with dead bodies couldn’t get through. So photographers had to remove all the bodies before taking pictures of streets and buildings in the city….”

“Vautrin [Minnie Vautrin] wrote of an occasion when a photographer told Chinese people to smile. Another member of the International Committee for the [Nanking] Safety Zone recorded that one day the Army gave out candies to kids before they took photos. Even if the photos weren’t staged, the refugees had no choice but to fawn on the Japanese soldiers. Acting otherwise meant their deaths….”

“I am certain that there were Chinese vendors in the street and even some thieves who stole things they needed. We shouldn’t forget that the refugees were struggling to survive no matter what. Had it not been for Japanese invasion, they wouldn’t have needed to go through such a horrible period in the first place.”

Go back to: Table of Contents


  1. William E. Daugherty, “China’s Official Publicity in The United States,” Public Opinion Quarterly 6.1 (Spring 1942): 73.
  2. Ibid.; Paul A. Varg, Missionaries, Chinese, and Diplomats: The American Protestant Missionary Movement in China, 1890-1952 (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1958), 260.
  3. Minoru Kitamura, “‘Nanking Daigyakusatsu’ Kenkyu Josetsu (Jo) [An Introduction to the Research on ‘The Nanjing Massacre’ (1)],” Toa 388 (October 1999): 36.
  4. Daugherty, 78-80.
  5. Joseph P. Selden, review of Japan: A World Problem, by H. J. Timperley, The Far Eastern Quarterly 2.4 (August 1943): 389; Kitamura, 34-37; Daugherty, 83.
  6. Ikuhiko Hata, Nanking Jiken [The Nanjing Incident], 9-10.
  7. H. J. Timperley, Japanese Terror in China (New York: Modern Age Books, 1938), 10.
  8. Matsumoto, 249-250.
  9. H. J. Timperley, “Yoshida Shoin Martyred Prophet of Japanese Expansionism,” Far Eastern Quarterly 1.4 (August 1942): 347.
  10. Ibid., 337-347; Timperley, Japan: A World Problem (New York: The John Day Company, 1942).
  11. The Times (London), 29 November 1954 and the Manchester Guardian, 29 November 1954.
  12. See American Missionary Eyewitnesses to the Nanking Massacre, 1937-1938, 13-15.
  13. Hsü Shuhsi, The War Conduct of the Japanese (Shanghai: Kelly and Walsh, 1938), 95-98.
  14. Timothy Brook, “Introduction: Documenting the Rape of Nanking,” in Documents of the Rape of Nanking, 12.
  15. Sun Zhaiwei, “Resistance by Citizen and Soldiers of Nanjing in the Nanjing Massacre,” in Nihongun ha Chugoku de Nani wo Shitaka [What the Imperial Army of Japan Did in China], ed. and trans. Kiyoshi Inoue and Tadashi Hiroshima (Tokyo: Aki Shobo, 1994), 82-86.
  16. The New York Times, 4 January, 1938.
  17. Documents of the Rape of Nanking, 231.
  18. Tokushi Kasahara, interview by author, Tokyo, Japan, 4 March 2000.

©2000 Masato Kajimoto. All Rights Reserved.

Japanese Propaganda

Japanese Propaganda

Media Blackout

"The day to complete the conquest of the walled city of Nanking" Tokyo Nichi Nichi newspaper evening edition on December 14, 1937.

“The day to complete the conquest of the walled city of Nanking” Tokyo Nichi Nichi newspaper evening edition on December 14, 1937.

“We heard yesterday that the Japanese News Agency, Domei, reported the population returning to their homes, business going on as usual and the population welcoming their Japanese visitors, or words to that effect,” wrote one of the missionaries in the Nanking Safety Zone, Robert Wilson, in his diary on December 21, 1937.

“If that is all the news that is going out of the city it is due for a big shake up when the real news breaks.” [120]

Throughout the Sino-Japanese War, the Imperial Army imposed a strict media blackout.

Article 12 of their censorship guideline for newspapers issued in September 1937 stated any news article or photograph “unfavorable” to the Army was subject to a gag.

The 13th Article affirmed that reports and photos concerning arrests or interrogations of Chinese soldiers and civilians that would give “an impression of torture” wouldn’t be approved.

The 14th prohibited any “photographs of atrocities” but endorsed reports about the “cruelty of Chinese” soldiers and civilians. [121]

As a result, although there were more than 100 journalists from Japan for the first week of the Japanese occupation of Nanking, stories of the brutal conduct by their countrymen never reached the Japanese general public at the time.

It was not until Wilson testified before the International Military Tribunal for the Far East in Tokyo on July 26, 1946, that the Nanking Atrocities made newspaper headlines. [122]

Without knowing about international condemnations, people in Japan celebrated the defeat of their enemy country’s capital nationwide with the press setting off the jubilant atmosphere by such headlines as “Banzai on the summit of Purple Mountain!” “Two great functions commemorating the victory to be held by Tokyo Asahi newspaper,” and “Nanking entirely conquered: Historical grand ceremony three days ahead in the walled city.” [123]

Propagation of Positive Images

Japanese troops giving out cigarettes to Chinese prisoners of war.

Japanese troops giving out cigarettes to Chinese prisoners of war.

The Japanese Army not only censored the news reports and photographs but also attempted to propagate peaceful images of the city.

“Some newspaper men came to the entrance of a concentration camp and distributed cakes and apples and handed out a few coins to the refugees. And a moving pictures was taken of this kind of act,” wrote another missionary, James McCallum, in his letter to his family on January 9, 1938.

“At the same time a bunch of soldiers climbed over the back wall of the compound and raped a dozen or so of the women. There were no pictures taken out back.” [124]

Sato Shinju, a photographer for Tokyo Nichi Nichi newspaper who stayed in Nanking until December 24, 1937, recalls a comparable occasion in the city. “The Army told us they were going to give some food and snacks to Chinese kids, and asked if we were interested in taking pictures of the scene,” says Sato. “They did not force us to go there, though. I assume they just wanted good publicity…. It was like an informal press conference.” [125]

The Asahi newspaper carried a photograph that might be the scene Sato was asked to take pictures of on December 24, 1937. The photo was titled “Peace restored in Nanjing” and the further caption noted, “Soldiers of the Imperial Army are giving candies to the refugees.” [126]

Other propaganda was aimed at the Chinese populace in Nanking. Upon entering the city, the Army distributed handbills that read, “Remain in your homes. Your neighbors from Japan want to restore peace.” [127]

George A. Fitch of the YMCA wrote in his diary:

While wholesale executions proceeded without interruption, Japanese army planes dropped leaflets from the air: “All good Chinese who return to their homes will be fed and clothed. Japan wants to be a good neighbor to those Chinese not fooled by monsters who are Chiang Kai-shek’s soldiers.” On the leaflet was a colored picture of a handsome Jap soldier, a Chinese child held Christ-like in his arms. At his feet a Chinese mother was bowing her thanks for bags of rice. [128]

Discrediting the Missionaries

A Japanese military postcard. Soldiers playing with Chinese children.

A Japanese military postcard. Soldiers playing with Chinese children.

To deal with the widespread condemnations abroad, the Japanese government tried to gloss over the atrocities by blaming subversive activities of some Chinese and by discrediting the “exaggerated” accounts given by the missionaries that were starting to circulate in the United States.

For instance, an American author named Frederick Vincent Williams, who was on the payroll of the Japanese propaganda organization, Jikyoku Iinkai, wrote a book called Behind the News in China in 1938 (to know more about Jikyoku Iinkai, see Appendix).

Although he did not directly mention Nanking, Williams implied that the atrocity stories were misguidedly reported in the United States. The pro-Japanese book claimed “the Chiang Kai-shek people” primed the foreign missionaries with “wild tales of alleged Japanese atrocities” and had them write “harrowing letters.” [129]

A Japanese newspaper, Osaka Mainichi, published such pamphlets as Common Sense and the China Emergency or The China Emergency in the English language that featured articles like “Japan’s Sole Aim – Peace of East Asia” or “Chinese Live in Japan Peacefully,” the tenor of which suggested Japan did not desire the “hideous war” and was by no means responsible for its provocation.

A newspaper-style four-page magazine, Japanese American, carried headlines such as “Nippon Saving China from Reds Writes Williams,” “Atrocity Stories Exploded as Real Facts Are Shown,” and “U.S. Enjoys Favorable Balance in Trade with Japan; Not with China.” [130] A leaflet printed late 1937 or early 1938 included a headline that reads “False Atrocity Stories Again Flood America!!!” referring to alleged use of poisonous gas shells, and other inhumane attacks by the Japanese troops in Shanghai and Nanking. [131]

A Japanese propaganda poster.

A Japanese propaganda poster.

The efforts to harm the reputation of the American Missionaries bore some fruits. A missionary in Japan, Arthur D. Berry, for instance, wrote to the Christian Advocate, “The stories of Japanese military forces deliberately destroying hospitals and schools in China, and deliberately slaughtering innocent Chinese people are slanderous lies.” [132]

In America a letter from one subscriber to Reader’s Digest claimed, “It is unbelievable that credence could be given a thing which is so obviously rank propaganda and so reminiscent of the stuff fed the public during the late war.” According to the magazine, it received similar comments from a number of readers. [133]

Reverend J. C. McKim apparently wrote a series of letters to the New York Times saying that it was not the Japanese but Chinese soldiers who were committing the atrocities.

“You were misinformed as far as Nanking was concerned,” wrote back John Magee, an American missionary in the Nanking Safety Zone, in a personal letter to McKim. After describing case after case of mass executions and rapes by the Japanese soldiers, Magee continued:

There was a small amount of looting of some shops by Chinese just before the Japanese entered. It is true that the homes of many people immediately outside the city walls were burnt down by the soldiers for defensive purposes, and this was certainly an outrage…. It is true that Chang Hsueh Liang’s troops, which showed up so miserably in the fighting, looted between here and Shanghai but there [they?] were executed by the hundreds. It is certainly unjust to have publicly accused the Chinese of such horrible things that happened here. [134]

An elementary school in Nanking. Chinese children receiving pro-Japanese education. Photo used by P. R. Dept. of the China Expeditionary Force of Japan.

An elementary school in Nanking. Chinese children receiving pro-Japanese education. Photo used by P. R. Dept. of the China Expeditionary Force of Japan.

Indeed, the members of the International Committee were all aware of the fact that the Japanese government tried to question the credibility of their reports.

On January 9 McCallum wrote, “Now the Japanese are trying to discredit our efforts in the Safety Zone. They threaten and intimidate poor Chinese into repudiating what we have said. Some of the Chinese are even ready to prove that the looting, raping and burning was done by the Chinese and not the Japanese.” [135]

Wilson’s diary on January 31 read, “We are branded as a lot of liars. The Japanese Embassy people tell people that everything we say is imaginative. That might be a lot truer if I were not a surgeon and have to patch up the results of their excesses.” [136]

In a letter to H. J. Timperley, a correspondent for the Manchester Guardian, Miner Searle Bates wrote on March 3, “There has been a steady stream of lying charges against the University in the Sin Shun Pao, the propagandist organ widely distributed in Shanghai and East China generally.”

“I don’t think there’s any way that they [the missionaries] could bias their accounts because they were just telling the facts,” says the archivist of the Yale Divinity School, Martha Smalley.

“They were not particularly fond of the Chinese government. They recognized a lot of corruption. So I don’t think they were proponents of the ‘Chinese view.’ I really don’t think the claim [to discredit the missionaries] has too much basis.” [137]

Go back to: Table of Contents


  1. Documents of the Rape of Nanking, 219.
  2. Shinichi Kusamori, “Fukyoka Shashin Ron: Houkoku no Shashin 2 [An Essay on Disapproved Photographs: Journalistic Photos on Japan 2],” in Mainichi Shinbun Hizou Fukyoka Shashin 2 [Stashed Photographs in Mainichi Newspaper: the Disapproved 2], (Tokyo: Mainichi Shinbun, 1999), 177-178.
  3. Takashi Yoshida, “A Battle Over History: The Nanjing Massacre in Japan,” in The Nanjing Massacre in History and Historiography, ed. Joshua A. Fogel (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2000), 73.
  4. Ikuhiko Hata, Nanking Jiken [The Nanjing Incident], 15-16.
  5. Ibid., 43.
  6. Interview by author, Fujisawa (Kanagawa Prefecture), Japan, 28 February 2000.
  7. Katsuichi Honda, Nankin he no Michi [The Road to Nanjing] (Tokyo: Asahi Bunko, 1989), 335.
  8. “The Sack of Nanking,” Readers’ Digest (July 1938): 29.
  9. Ibid., 31.
  10. Frederick Vincent Williams, Behind the News in China (New York: Nelson Hughes, 1938), 113-116.
  11. “In the Propaganda Arena (in Surveys; Professional Services),” Public Opinion Quarterly 2.3 (July 1938): 493-494.
  12. Bruno Lasker and Agnes Roman, Propaganda from China and Japan: A Case Study in Propaganda Analysis (American Council, Institute of Pacific Relations, 1938), 80.
  13. “Missionaries Write Home,” letter from Arthur D. Berry, The Christian Advocate (6 January 1938): 7, quoted in Paul A. Varg, Missionaries, Chinese, and Diplomats (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1958), 263.
  14. “We Were In Nanking,” Readers’ Digest (October 1938): 41.
  15. American Missionary Eyewitnesses to the Nanking Massacre, 1937-1938, 63.
  16. American Missionary Eyewitnesses to the Nanking Massacre, 1937-1938, 43.
  17. Documents of the Rape of Nanking, 246.
  18. Martha L. Smalley, interview by author, New Haven, Connecticut, 25 January 2000.

©2000 Masato Kajimoto. All Rights Reserved.

Appendix: Propaganda Activities

Propaganda Activities in Northern China – Utilization of Atrocity Stories

“When the Marco Polo Bridge incident on 7 July 1937 set off full-scale war between China and Japan,” wrote a professor of Chinese literature, Leo Ou-fan Lee, in The Cambridge History of China, “it also unleashed a crescendo of literary activities.”

In China all factional intellectuals in the early thirties united at once and flocked to the banner of “K’ang-chan,” or “the war of resistance,” issuing spontaneous anti-Japanese manifestos.

Only a few days after the incident, for example, some sixteen dramatists in Shanghai created a three-act play called Pao-wei Lu-Kou-ch’iao, or Defend the Marco Polo Bridge.

In March 1938 in Hankow the All-China Resistance Association of Writers and Artists was founded, led by Lao She. Within a short time, branches sprang up in major cities all over China.

The member writers visited battlefronts, “fraternized” with the soldiers and filed “emotion-tinged” reportage in the form of journalistic or proto-journalistic literature, which gained enormous popularity. The Association also assigned young writers in rural areas to initiate literary activities in the region, provided specific themes, and corrected their reports and creative writings. In Shanghai area, more than three hundred reports of those kinds were seemingly organized “in a matter of days.”

According to Leo, the two reigning slogans in the field of literature were: “Literature must go to the countryside! Literature must join the army!” and “Propaganda first, art second!”

Besides the visiting teams and the literary reporters, the Association created five propaganda teams and ten dramatic troops. Soon the dramatic groups became extremely popular and in 1939 they included as many as 130,000 performers. [115]

Haldore Hanson, a freelance journalist and Associated Press correspondent in China, spent two weeks with the local “guerilla” group or the Self-Defense Government, in Central Hopei in March 1938. Traveling in the region, he saw some drama performances written for the local people and wrote:

The themes were all anti-Japanese and had been written especially for the Hopei people. A typical theme: a drunken Japanese soldier (the actor wearing a real Japanese uniform) enters a home and tries to rape the mother but is killed by the daughter who fetches the family meat cleaver.

The crowd cheered lustily when the little girl, after hesitating for several minutes, finally felled the enemy. Between the acts of this dramatic program the school children sang patriotic songs, led the crowd in cheers, and performed a sword dance. Mass meeting are popular among villagers. [116]

Hanson observed several mass meetings of over 20,000 peasants with speeches, dramas and patriotic songs. In his words, all speeches painted the Imperial Army of Japan as “the most depraved fiend on earth,” and “every atrocity committed by the Japanese soldiers – murder, rape, robbery, the burning of villages, the polluting of wells – was dwelt on in the blood-chilling orations delivered by these political agents.” [117]

Although Kuomintang’s official propaganda organization was established within the National Military Council in 1938, it was Communists and their sympathizers who were indeed in charge of the entire propaganda operations domestically. [118] The Kuomintang flag and the Communist emblem were always shown together at public meetings.

In Hanson’s view, the emphasis of all propaganda was to appeal to a “family-oriented peasantry,” rather than to educate peasants to create a socialist republic.

In his article, he described a cartoon in six scenes pasted on the walls of hundreds of villages, which made “tremendous appeal to a simple peasantry,” as follows:

The artist shows a Japanese officer welcomed into a Chinese home, then making love to the daughter at the dinner table, next trying to rape her that night, then the parents rushing to her assistance and being shot dead, finally the officer satisfying his lust and killing the daughter.

Through this cartoon, “they are taught to fight not for Communism,” wrote the journalist, “but against ‘wicked enemy’ who is said to be slaughtering the villagers and endangering the ancestral altars.” [119]


  1. Leo Ou-fan Lee, “Literary Trends: the Road to Revolution 1927-1949,” in The Cambridge History of China 13, ed. John K. Fairbank and Denis Twithchett (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986), 466-470.
  2. Haldore Hanson, “The People Behind the Chinese Guerillas,” Pacific Affairs 11.3 (September 1938): 289.
  3. Ibid.
  4. Leo, 467.
  5. Hanson, 290-291.

End of A Propaganda Organization – Jikyoku Iinkai in the United States

On June 1, 1942 in Federal District Court in Washington D.C., an American named Frederick Vincent Williams was convicted of conspiracy and nine violations of the Foreign Agents Act after a three-week trial.

Williams, who wrote in his 1938 Behind the News in China that “the Chiang Kai-shek people” talked the foreign missionaries into writing about “wild tales of alleged Japanese atrocities” in their “harrowing letters,” [138] indeed worked with a Japanese organization, Jikyoku Iinkai, to propagate the doctrine that Japan was not an enemy to the United States. [139]

Jikyoku Iinkai, which literally means the committee for current state of affairs in Japanese, was known as the Japanese Committee on Trade and Information. It was financed and controlled by the Japanese government, which spent some $195,000 for the purpose of spreading propaganda in the United States through radio speeches, a monthly magazine and pro-Japanese booklets.

Williams, along with his two American confederates, David Warren Ryder and Ralph Townsend, worked closely with five other Japanese agents to distribute their side of the stories on the Second Sino-Japanese War. All three Americans and the five Japanese were later indicted by a Federal Grand Jury.

Legally registered as an employee at a Japanese steamship line, Nippon Yusen, Frederick Vincent Williams, or “Wiggy,” operated as a correspondent of an English language newspaper published in Tokyo. Jikyoku Iinkai funds were deposited under Williams’ name in the Yokohama Specie Bank. The Japanese Consulate General in San Francisco was also frequently seen to have put money in his bank account.

On June 5, 1942, Williams was sentenced to 16 months to four years in prison, which included eight months to two years for conspiracy and an equal term for filing nine false registrations with the State Department.

Among the three American conspirators the most prolific writer was Ralph Townsend, a former college professor who brought back strong Japanese sympathies from his several years of service as a consular officer in China. “After he visited Japan in 1937,” wrote the Washington Post, “propaganda began to hum on the West Coast.”

Townsend wrote a number of pamphlets and books such as The High Cost of Hate, America Has No Enemies in Asia, and Seeking Foreign Trouble, [140] made numerous speeches and radio talks, and edited an anti-British magazine, Scribner’s Commentator.

Townsend admitted having concealed he was in the pay of the Japanese and pleaded guilty to the charge that he violated the Foreign Agents Act. Although the author of this online documentary could not find what sentence Townsend received, the most he could get was a $1,000 fine and eight to 24 months in prison.

A former newspaper man, David Warren Ryder, was given the same prison term as Williams. According to one witness, it was Ryder who developed the scheme for wholesaling “pro-Japanese publicity” in the United States and initiated the large-scale operations.

Of the five Japanese conspirators the only one who was arrested by Federal authorities was Obana Tsutomu, who pleaded guilty at the beginning of the trial and testified against Williams and Ryder. The other four, including K. Takahashi, the manager of the Nippon Yusen, had fled to Japan long before the prosecution cracked down.

Obana was sentenced to a rather light punishment, two to six months’ imprisonment. The Post quoted the presiding judge Goldsborough as saying, “It is to be said for Obana that he did not try to be crookedly smart, he was not disloyal to his country, he attempted no betrayal.” [141]

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  1. Williams, 113-116.
  2. As to information on Jikyku Iinkai and the trial, the author went through a series of articles by Dillard Stokes appeared in the Washington Post on 10, 12, 13, 15, 16, 19, 20, 26, 27 of May 1942 and 2, 5, 6 of June 1942 as well as the San Francisco Chronicle on 28 March and 11 May 1942, and San Francisco News on 27 March 1942.
  3. For detailed citations, see the holdings of the California State Library System under Ralph Townsend. The list could be also seen at
  4. Dillard Stokes, “Jap Agents Given Jail Terms, Lecture,” the Washington Post, 6 June 1942.

©2000 Masato Kajimoto. All Rights Reserved.